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Over the last two decades, social democratic-labour parties (SDLPs) have been confronted by various 
challenges which have had a dramatic impact upon their ideological orientation.  Not least of which, 
these include emerging challenger parties, as well as the Neo-Liberal discourse of the New Right.  In 
this paper, we compare the ideological positioning of three parties in Sweden, Germany, and 
particularly in Great Britain. We conclude that the ideological profile of ‘New Labour’ now largely 
mirrors those of other SDLPs. The results are based upon a content analysis of the 1994 (Germany 
and Sweden) and 1997 (Great Britain) election rhetorics in party manifestos and television debates.  
The analysis centres on the extent to which the three SDLPs refer to the discourses of Socialism, the 
Welfare State, Neo-Liberalism, and Ecologism. 
 
Since the 1980s neo-liberal ideology has encroached upon virtually all modern welfare states.  This has had the 
effect of undermining support for welfare state-collectivist concerns, reflected in particular in terms of 
adjustments within the general orientations and programmatic commitments of western social democratic-labour 
parties (SDLPs).  The erosion of traditional leftist-collectivist concerns has occurred at both economic and 
social levels. At the economic level, we have witnessed a gradual withdrawal of state intervention within the 
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economy, and a general de-industrialisation of society.  As a result, various social structural changes have taken 
place within the electorate which have led to a reduction in the size of the social base for SDLPs. This in turn 
has led to a re-positioning of these parties to maintain core support and extend their appeal to new (predominately 
middle class) electoral constituencies.  At the social level there has been a shift in emphasis from collectivist-
rights notions of social policy (based on redistributive taxation and the collective provision of social services and 
resources) to a concern for the encouragement of individual responsibility in social life.  Again, this neo-liberal 
rhetoric has been most obvious in terms of the programmatic shifts in emphasis of SDLPs away from traditional 
leftist-collectivist concerns and approaches.  
 In this paper, our intention is to summarise the various challenges and the consequent programmatic 
adjustments of three major social democratic-labour parties in Western Europe: the Swedish Social Democratic 
Labour Party (SAP), the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the British Labour Party. To empirically 
test the extent of any programmatic adjustments, data is drawn from a quantitative content analysis of party 
election manifestos and television debates held in these three countries at the elections in 1994 (Germany and 
Sweden) and 1997 (Great Britain).  The analytical categories used in this analysis are considerably more 
detailed than data from other research efforts in the field.i 
 This paper will give a brief overview of the most significant programmatic changes of the SAP, SPD 
and the Labour Party over the last two decades as they succumbed to neo-liberal rhetoric, and to the decline of 
collectivism at the economic and social levels. From this, we will address a number of important questions.  
Firstly, to what degree have SDLPs (and we include the British Labour Party loosely within the social 
democratic-labour familles spirituelles here, although recognising the problems in doing so)ii responded to 
the challenge of competing ideologies (including primarily neo-liberalism, but also environmentalism), and 
jettisoned welfare state-collectivist commitments?  
 Secondly, we intend to adopt a comparative approach in order to answer questions about the relative 
ideological positions of these parties in terms of their commitment to the welfare state and to their traditional 
emphases on the value of equality and solidarity.  Much attention has been given to the changes which have 
taken place within the British Labour Party throughout the 1990s.iii However, as Shawiv observes, ‘the shedding 
of traditional left-wing tenets in Britain is part of a general pattern in which social democratic parties have 
adjusted to free market consensus - extending even to its heartland in Scandinavia, where social democratic 
governments have been retrenching on welfare spending, deregulating financial markets and presiding over 
growing inequality and unemployment.’ However, the pace of change, together with the extent to which these 
developments appear to have taken firmest hold appears to be most obvious within the British Labour Party, 
leading some to conclude that ‘New Labour’ represents an irreversible break with traditional social 
democracy.v  The primary objective of this paper therefore involves an examination of the Labour Party in 
relation to the other two parties selected for study: Has the Labour Party shifted further from the left than the 
other two parties, or has it just adjusted to the general trend undergone by other SDLPs in Western Europe? 
Other comparative questions to be addressed include: To what extent have developments within the SAP 
reflected an adaptation to the neo-liberal agenda?; And, is the position of the SPD (confronted by the challenge 
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of both the Greens, and the burgeoning neo-liberal ideology) to be found at an intermediate point between 
Labour and the SAP, or does it take a more entrenched social democratic position? 
 
 
IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO THE WELFARE STATE DISCOURSE 
 
Like other parties, SDLPs are a result both of their political environment and of their strategy and ability to 
change this environment in their favour.vi  Maurice Duvergervii has noted that SDLPs reflect societies’ 
conflicts within their party organisation, in that there will inevitably be factions and groups competing for 
internal power, influence and control over the party. Furthermore, the strategy employed to change the external 
political environment is usually dependent upon the balance between often competing ideological positions 
and interpretations within an organisation. One of the most successful interpretations of society by SDLPs is 
the concept of the welfare state. This concept represents a dilution of socialist ideology and a compromise 
with Capital, and as such, is a practical concept rather than a utopia (such as socialism or communism). 
 However, the welfare state has very different forms and it changes over time.viii  We are able to 
broadly distinguish three different types of welfare state regime ix  which form quite distinct political 
environments for SDLPs. First, there is the social democratic welfare state which is characterised by 
universalism and the usurpation of the market. Typically in this type of welfare state regime, SDLPs have been 
most successful in shaping their political environment. Such parties have been able to promote social equality 
by at least partially overcoming the basic rules of the capitalist free-market economy. The redistributive effects 
in these states are also substantial. Examples of this type of welfare state include those in the Netherlands, and 
above all in the Scandinavian countries. In many respects, the leading country is Sweden, with its highly 
developed welfare state, and the long uninterrupted period of rule by the Social Democrats.x 
 The least developed type of welfare state regime is the liberal or market-oriented welfare state. Here 
social benefits are modest and cover only minimal social needs. Entitlement rules are strict, and are often 
associated with stigma. Private insurance policies are encouraged by the state, and market differentiations are 
reinforced. Typical examples of this type of welfare state regime include Canada, Switzerland, Japan, 
Australia and the USA. The British welfare state, especially throughout the years of the Thatcher government, 
also qualifies for this category. 
 Finally, there is a group of countries that form an intermediate type between the market-oriented and 
social democratic variants of welfare state. Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1985) labels this type of welfare state the 
conservative or corporatist welfare state. Such welfare states often have their origins in pre-democratic or 
authoritarian states such as Bismark’s Germany, and sought to use social policy as a means of defusing the 
threat of working class mobilisation. They are guided by the principle of “subsidiarity” (where the state 
supports and delivers only those forms of welfare which are not provided by other institutions such as the 
church or family). The conservative welfare state regime is defined by social policy which is attached to class 
and status. Although the level of state benefits are sufficient for the recipient, the impact of redistribution is 
negligible. This type of welfare state regime is most prominent in Germany, Austria, Italy, France and Belgium. 
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 This discussion suggests that the three SDLPs selected for investigation in this study belong to three 
different welfare state regimes. As a consequence of this, we would expect them to face different ideological 
pressures, and that their election rhetorics will reflect this.  The British Labour Party operates within a 
market-oriented welfare state regime. As a result, during the period from 1979 to 1997 when the Conservative 
Party was in government, Labour was exposed to a strong neo-liberal or New Right attack on the welfare state.  
Like the British Labour Party, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) has been in opposition since the 
early 1980s. However, the major government party in Germany, the Christian Democratic Party, subscribes 
to the principle of the conservative welfare state regime. The rhetoric of the New Right was mainly introduced 
by the smaller coalition party, the Liberals.  In recent years, and largely as a result of severe economic 
problems following unification, the neo-liberal rhetoric has also become increasingly prominent in German 
politics. 
 The Swedish Social Democrats (SAP) operate within the most favourable political environment, and 
indeed were largely responsible for shaping the Swedish welfare state.xi  The uninterrupted government 
position of the SAP from 1932 until 1976 created the most advanced and developed welfare state in the 
Western world. Even the coalition government of non-socialist parties from 1976 until 1982 did not 
substantially change the welfare state. Ironically, it was the 1982-1991 Social Democratic government which 
initiated the process of welfare state retrenchment. However, neo-liberal rhetoric became increasingly 
dominant during the 1980s. The Conservative Party pushed New Right issues onto the political agenda, and 
by so doing established itself as the foremost opposition party. In achieving this position, it succeeded the 
Center Party which is still committed to many aspects of the welfare state. The same welfare state orientation 
holds for the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties.xii  The 1991-1994 non-socialist government, although 
divided, pushed neo-liberal issues onto the agenda.  Aggressive attacks by the Conservative Party called into 
question the historical compromise represented by the Swedish welfare state. However, as a result of 
government policies during this period, unemployment reached unprecedented post-War heights. In this 
context, the SAP offered an alternative program at the 1994 election campaign which was predominantly 
welfare statist in orientation.xiii 
 
 
CHANGING DISCOURSES IN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC-LABOUR PARTIES: AN HISTORICAL 
ACCOUNT 
 
The tactics and ideological orientations of SDLPs are also susceptible to the political environment and party 
strategy. Besides a minor communitarian strand which was transformed into an anarcho-syndicalist ideology 
at the beginning of the 20
th
 century in most West European societies, the dominant Marxist socialist strand 
focused on the redistribution of scarce resources and the socialisation of the means of production. The 
participation of workers and their representatives was seen as an essential step towards the transition from a 
capitalist society towards a socialist society. Another, social democratic variant took shape later on with the 
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establishment of liberal democratic regimes in these countries. This social democratic variant can be 
considered to be a dilution of socialist thinking, and accepts various aspects of political, and above all 
economic, liberalism. An early re-formulation of the socialist rhetoric appeared in the 1930s with the 
development of Keynesianism.  However, the historical ideological development varied across the three 
countries investigated, and we will address these differences in turn. 
 
 
Sweden 
 
The Swedish version of this social democratic ideology was the SAP-developed concept of a “People’s 
Home”.xiv  This term was used by the former Swedish Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson to outline his idea 
of a caring society. In the early 1930s, the SAP was able to put this ideology into practice. Herbert Tingstenxv 
summarises the transition of the SAP in this period: ‘Socialisation has been replaced by social welfare, class 
conflict by “the people’s home”, democracy as a tactical means by democracy as the highest principle, the 
total conquest of power by compromise, agreement and collaboration...’.  However, the Socialist discourse 
never entirely disappeared from the SAP. In particular the confederation of blue collar trade unions (LO) is 
deeply integrated within the SAP and has repeatedly sought to revive the Socialist discourse. One illustrative 
example is the attempt to introduce the wage earner funds in the mid-1970s.xvi 
  By the 1980s, the welfare state was in retreat. The Social Democrats elected in 1982 introduced 
various elements of economic liberalism in their governmental program. In particular, Kjell-Olof Feldt, 
representing the more market-oriented wing of the SAP, occupied the crucial position of Finance Minister 
within the Government.  Neo-liberal rhetoric increased in importance in Sweden during the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s. This was a major contributing factor to the fall from power of the Social Democrats in the 
1991 election where ‘... an economically more pro-market position would have benefited its performance’.xvii 
However, increasing unemployment rates, together with severe cuts in the welfare state led to a decline in 
popularity of the non-socialist government. At the 1994 election campaign, the SAP emphasised what they 
considered to be the superiority of their social policy/welfare statist program over the Conservative’s neo-
liberal agenda for solving the economic crisis.  
 
 
Germany 
 
Throughout the post-War period, the replacement of a Socialist by a Welfare State discourse became 
increasingly established among many Western societies. After the Second World War, German politicians 
from the major political camps were all largely critical of capitalism. However, it was the conservative forces 
who were by and large charged with, and indeed dominated the process involved in, the restoration of post-
War Germany. Konrad Adenauer soon established a non-socialist government and the SPD remained in 
opposition until 1966. In these early years after the Second World War it became increasingly advocated 
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within social democratic circles that an anti-capitalist class struggle rhetoric would not be sufficient for 
defeating successive conservative governments. The Cold War and the division of Germany stigmatised the 
Socialist discourse in West Germany. These circumstances were translated in programmatic terms by the 
Godesberger Program in 1959, in which the SPD accepted the principles of the capitalist market economy and 
formulated a social democratic program. However, it was almost a whole decade before the SPD achieved 
governmental status, in coalitions first with the Christian Democrats (1966-1969) and then with the Liberals 
(1969-1982). From the early 1970s, the SPD formulated many social reforms under the Chancellorship of 
Willy Brandt. However, by 1976 the SPD, under the stewardship of Helmut Schmidt, turned increasingly 
toward economic liberalism, and introduced a series of austerity policies throughout the late 1970s and early 
1980s. 
 Following the Christian Democrats electoral victory in 1983,  the SPD in opposition changed its 
priorities several times. However, these changes had more to do with left-libertarian challenges (above all 
from the Greens) than with welfare state policy. Later, German unification brought with it severe economic 
constraints, and also led to an increased neo-liberal rhetoric by the government. The SPD was not immune to 
this rhetoric, and from the mid-1990s, the party increasingly embraced a neo-liberal agenda. 
 
 
Great Britain 
 
Furthest away from what we might call a social democratic Welfare State discourse, and by contrast closest 
(historically) to a Socialist discourse, was the British Labour Party.  As late as 1986, Labour leader Neil 
Kinnockxviii distinguished his party from social democracy, and in so doing, reaffirmed by implication his 
party’s ‘socialist’ mission: ‘The essence of social democracy is that it is not concerned with the structure of 
property ownership or the transfer of economic power . . . not of eradicating inequality but relieving its most 
gross manifestations.’  
 Throughout the post-War period until the late 1970s, there was significant tension between the 
orthodox Socialist discourse and the increasingly dominant social democratic Welfare State discourse.  This 
was perhaps best manifest in the debate over the status of Clause Fourxix at the Party conference in 1959. Party 
leader Gaitskell and the social democrats attempted to reshape the Labour Party in the quest for electability 
which they considered to be hampered by commitments to nationalisation through Clause Four, although they 
ultimately lost the debate. 
 When Labour were elected to governmental office in 1974, it was at a time of economic crisis which 
effectively undermined the post-War welfare state settlement.  The response of Labour to the ongoing 
recession was to introduce an austerity program (largely at the behest of the International Monetary Fund) and 
to attempt to impose a policy of wage restraint on the trade union movement.  This resulted in the ‘Winter of 
Discontent’, and a breakdown in the relationship between Labour and the unions.  Almost inevitably, this 
confrontation led to defeat for the Labour Party  at the General Election in 1979. 
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 Over the course of the subsequent 18 years, the Labour Party in opposition underwent a series of 
dramatic internal organisational and ideological-programmatic changes.  By 1983, it had taken a radical left 
turn.  The defection in 1981 of the Gang of Fourxx from Labour to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
was the result of a series of organisational and policy changes instigated by an alliance of the Party left-wing 
and the trades unions.  These developments significantly weakened the social democratic grouping within 
the Party leadership.  At the same time the period was one of ‘unprecedented left advance’.xxi  The Party 
then went on to adopt a radical transformative manifesto at the 1983 General Election, with plans, for instance, 
for increased nationalisation of key industries, import controls, a large public spending program to help reduce 
unemployment, increased welfare spending, the introduction of a wealth tax, industrial democracy, a reduction 
in the working week without loss of pay, withdrawal from the EEC, and unilateral nuclear disarmament.   
  However, with the social democratic-left vote split between Labour and the SDP, and against the 
backdrop of a military victory over the Falklands, the Conservatives won a landslide election triumph in 1983. 
The Labour Party only narrowly avoided being pushed into third place by the more social democratic-oriented 
SDP.xxii As a consequence, the socialist agenda within Labour was marginalised. Some commentators claimed 
that the electorate was no longer pre-disposed to either a socialist or a social democratic agenda, and as a 
consequence, if the Labour Party was ever again to win governmental power, it needed to revise its traditional 
commitments and policies.xxiii 
 After this and the later election defeat in 1987, the Party leadership under Neil Kinnock embarked 
upon a process of ‘modernisation’.xxiv  This involved the introduction of a program of organisational and 
policy changes which Gamble and Kelly xxv  claim were motivated by a hegemony of Thatcherite neo-
Liberalism over political ideas, giving new legitimacy to individualism, choice and the free market as opposed 
to social democracy.   
 In the aftermath of another election defeat in 1992, Labour, under the steward-ship of Tony Blair, has 
become ‘New’ Labour, and continued the modernisation process with the rejection of traditional socialist 
priorities,xxvi and the adoption of a more social democratic, and increasingly neo-liberal, orientation.xxvii 
Gamblexxviii claims that: ‘In endorsing the radical, anti-statist line of Thatcherism, Blair implies that this is the 
ground that Labour must take as well.’ It is generally agreed that this ‘New Labour’ project is one which has 
gained increased momentum, and now dominates the Labour Party.  As a consequence, there has been a 
qualitative change in the political, organisational and ideological orientation of the Party.xxix  In many ways, 
the Party elite may consider that they have been vindicated with the direction in which they have steered 
Labour following its landslide General Election victory in 1997.xxx   
 
 
 
WELFARE STATE DISCOURSE UNDER SIEGE 
 
In order to place this analysis of the discourse on the welfare state into context, it is useful to consider two 
important aspects which have been described as especially important for the future of the welfare state and the 
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transition of social democracy.xxxi One is the status of the Socialist discourse in modern SDLPs. Herbert 
Kitscheltxxxii postulates that the Swedish and above all British SDLPs are too socialist to be vote- or office-
maximising. However, this conclusion is based on an analysis of the parties conducted in the 1980s. How did 
the discourse change in the 1990s after the reforms initiated within the British Labour Party by Tony Blair, 
and after the Swedish SAP had time to adapt in its three-year-period of opposition? This question also poses 
another one: in which direction did the discourse change? The likelihood is that the Socialist discourse lost 
ground, and the Welfare State discourse became more prominent. Another possible development is that the 
predominant Welfare State discourse became infused with aspects of neo-liberalism. This is likely to be the 
case for all the parties studied. The degree to which the three SDLPs integrated neo-liberal elements in their 
electoral discourse will be the major focus of our study. 
 The other defining challenge to social democracy in modern societies is the Ecological discourse, 
which is part of the Left-Libertarian discourse. The ecological cleavage is differently mobilised in Western 
societies. For our selected countries, it is most highly mobilised in Germany, followed by Sweden, and finally 
in Great Britain.xxxiii  This means that it is very important for the German SPD to respond to the left-libertarian 
discourse, less so but still important for the Swedish SAP, and least important for the British Labour Party. 
Kitschelt’s resultsxxxiv demonstrate that the SPD is most open to left-libertarianism while ‘... the Swedish 
Social Democrats are moderately socialist but lack any libertarian issue leadership.’ The SAP, according to 
Kitschelt’s analysis scores even lower than the British Labour Party in this respect. This again may be the 
result of the influence of the Swedish blue collar union on the SAP.xxxv 
 For Germany, the major problem confronted by the SPD is its vacillation between an ecological 
position and a conventional social democratic program. xxxvi   The Socialist discourse seems now to be 
relatively marginalised within the SPD: ‘By the early 1980s, the Marxist-socialist Left in the SPD was virtually 
dead’.xxxvii  An important question to be addressed in this paper is which of these two poles (ecological or 
social democratic) dominated at the 1994 German election?  The SPD program was relatively open to the 
Ecological discourse at the 1990 (re-unification) election under the leadership of Oskar Lafontaine.xxxviii 
However, after this the discourse became more social democratic (emphasising, for instance, policies 
concerning unemployment, the inequality between the rich and the poor, and so on). The severe economic 
problems in Eastern Germany and their impact on Western Germany were also shifting the political agenda 
away from ecological concerns. As a consequence of this, by the mid-1990s the SPD were embracing various 
neo-liberal solutions within its agenda in order to address the problems the country faced. We intend to reveal 
how far this is reflected in the 1994 SPD election campaign rhetoric. 
 
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Our data and research design preclude the opportunity for a longitudinal analysis. Instead the selected SDLPs 
will be assessed comparatively. We will examine the extent to which these parties differ from each other in 
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terms of the aspects outlined above. In addressing these questions by considering both the historical 
development of, and the literature on, the three SDLPs, our hypotheses are: 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Socialist Discourse 
 
Although the British Labour Party has undergone substantial organisational and policy reform, we would 
expect that the Socialist discourse is nonetheless strongest within the British Labour Party, but not markedly 
different from either the Swedish SAP or the German SPD. The SPD abandoned this socialist rhetoric nearly 
forty years ago; furthermore it operates within a broadly corporatist welfare state regime which does not 
polarise welfare state concerns (and avoids radicalising them, as in the case of Britain). This hypothesis is also 
supported in that trade unions have a much stronger influence on party policy in Sweden and Great Britain 
than in Germany.xxxix  However, as an alternative hypothesis, the British Labour Party may also have moved 
so far away from its Socialist discourse that it now places less emphasis on socialist elements than either the 
SPD or the SAP. This would be an indicator for the degree to which Labour has been transformed under the 
leadership of Tony Blair from a party with a strong socialist discourse. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Welfare State and Neo-Liberal Discourses 
 
According to the earlier discussion concerning the political environment and the historical development of the 
selected SDLPs, the Welfare State discourse is likely to be most important in Sweden, followed by Germany 
and then Great Britain.  This is because of the nature and historical strength of the Swedish welfare state, and 
the longevity of SAP rule. However, more important than that is the degree to which the three parties have 
incorporated elements of the Neo-Liberal discourse when referring to the welfare state. In this respect it is 
difficult to make profound statements since this development is relatively new, and the literature has, to date, 
not taken up the issue of how far SDLPs have opened their political agenda to the Neo-Liberal discourse. 
However, the recent changes within the British Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair suggest that 
there is a trend within these parties to adopt market-oriented solutions more readily than before. As mentioned 
above, the Swedish and German Social Democrats followed similar paths, even if they did this in a rather less 
pronounced way than the British Labour Party. 
 We might hypothesise that the transition of the Labour Party to the market-oriented welfare state 
regime may have resulted in it becoming more open to neo-liberal rhetoric than the other two parties which 
we have examined. The SAP as a ‘Welfare State’ party is likely to be most resistant to the neo-liberal rhetoric. 
The SPD on the other hand, faced with the economic pressures of unification, may have taken an intermediate 
position between the SAP and the Labour Party. 
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Hypothesis 3: Ecological Discourse 
 
There is a substantial general literature on the left-libertarian discourse in SDLPs xl , although this is 
comparatively very limited for the British Labour Party. The consideration of the political environment and 
party strategies of the three SDLPs selected for this study would lead to the conclusion that the SPD is most 
open to the Ecological discourse. For Britain and Sweden there are relatively few signs of any incorporation 
of environmental issues: ‘Overall, it is fair to conclude that the Swedish social democrats, like their British 
colleagues, missed the opportunity to seize the new issues and build electoral coalitions around ecology and 
feminism’.xli  
 In this respect the SAP may be least open to the Ecological discourse because it is interwoven in 
corporatist politics.xlii Furthermore, the relative success of the Swedish welfare state was also grounded in 
efficiency and economic growth.xliii  The British Labour Party is likely to take an intermediate position 
between the SAP and SPD.xliv  Its long period in opposition may have made the Labour Party relatively more 
receptive to the idea of integrating the Ecological discourse within its program in order to be more attractive 
to the new middle classes.  As has already been mentioned, the SPD may have gone furthest down the road 
towards an Ecological discourse - even if it has not been consistent over time. The reasons for the openness 
of the SPD to this Ecological discourse is based on its lengthy period in opposition, as well as the high saliency 
of ecological issues in German society. 
 
 
THE DATA 
 
Given the different political environments and developments of these SDLPs, what would be the political 
discourse in the mid-1990s in the three countries under investigation? In order to address this question, we 
have conducted a comprehensive analysis of party statements made during the 1994 elections in Germany and 
Sweden, and the 1997 election in Great Britain.  
 However, it should be acknowledged that the ideological positions of political parties during election 
campaigns differs from their general positions. In election campaigns, party pronouncements on issues are 
shaped in such a way that they relate to a large proportion of the electorate. In this way party ideologies are 
‘adjusted’ to political trends and situations. On the other hand, statements made during election campaigns are 
not entirely independent of the general party ideology. Thus, election campaigns mediate between the party 
ideology, political trends, situations and the voters.xlv  Another key point to note is that we are not measuring 
party positions here as such, but rather party images. A party image in this sense is the picture a party presents 
of itself during the election campaign. As can be seen from the historical analysis conducted by the Party 
Manifestos Project, party images vary significantly more than party positions.xlvi 
 The following findings have been generated from a larger scale comparative research project. 
Different aspects of the campaign discourse of political parties have been analysed by means of a rigorous 
quantitative content analysis of election manifestos and the final television debates between leading party 
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candidates. The combined results of this data are reported here because the election manifestos and the 
television debates represent slightly different but nonetheless important aspects of election campaigns. The 
election manifestos are produced by the parties and represent an undisturbed positioning of the party. Party 
manifestos are normally approved by an authoritative party body: ‘In any case, the campaign document is the 
only statement of policy made with authority on behalf of the whole party’.xlvii Statements made by party 
representatives during the journalist-led television debates are less controlled. 
 Election manifestos differ considerably in the three countries selected for this study. While these 
documents are relatively short in Sweden, they are typically more substantial documents in Britain and 
Germany. In order to reconcile our highly detailed content analysis, we decided only to analyse the preamble 
of the German election manifestos which, at between one and five pages, is of equivalent length and character 
to the Swedish election manifestos.xlviii  For the British Labour Party we decided to analyse the introduction, 
together with the preamble and summary for each of the policy and issue sections. 
 There were also some differences in the organisation of the television-debates. While in Sweden the 
party leaders participated in such a debate two days before the election, in Germany several debates with high 
ranking party officials took place. However, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was not willing to take part in these 
debates. Therefore, the main candidate for the SPD, Rudolf Scharping, also refused to participate.  As a 
consequence, we decided to analyse one of the television debates broadcast with high ranking party officials 
which dealt with general political issues shortly before the election.xlix The structure, format and timing of 
this debate came closest to the Swedish television debate. At the British General Election in 1997, it did 
initially appear that a historical precedent might be broken when the main party leaders floated the idea of 
meeting in a televised debate.  However, as Taitl notes: ‘After more than two months of discussions, the 
negotiations broke down in the first week of the campaign in acrimonious circumstances, with the parties 
blaming one another and the broadcasters’. Consequently, we decided to use the Deputy Leader’s debate which 
was broadcast on the BBC on the Sunday before the General Election.  This was the last such debate held 
during the pre-election campaign. li   For all the debates, participants covered a wide variety of social, 
economic, and political issues. 
 For this paper, the data refer to one variable which focuses on the issue content of election messages. 
This variable investigates the policy issues addressed by the parties from a list of around one hundred pre-
defined categories.  The coded unit of analysis is “statements”. A new statement is registered each time a 
change of value occurs concerning the variable which records an issue matter (switching from tax policies to 
environmental policies, for example).lii In contrast to other studies in the field which rely on saliency theoryliii 
and which only count whether or not an issue is addressed, we coded statements in either positive or negative 
terms.liv This means for instance, that we are able to distinguish between the preference to increase taxes on 
the one hand, and to lower taxes on the other. 
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INDICATORS OF THE DISCOURSES 
 
In the following analysis we identify all those statements which refer to the Socialist, Welfare State, Neo-
Liberal and Ecological discourses.  We include only those directional statements which refer to the four 
discourses (and how much attention was given proportionately to each), and disregard all other statements.  
The operationalisation of the four different discourses is as follows: 
 
Socialist Discourse 
 
The Socialist discourse focuses on the dispute concerning public and private control over the means of 
production. Statements in this context include the demand for a higher state influence over the economy, and 
the demands for more socialism and radical left policies. Furthermore, statements such as a stronger influence 
from workers and trade unions within work-places, and industrial democracy more generally were also 
included in the index. 
 
Welfare State Discourse 
 
Statements used for the welfare state index are: support for the expansion or preservation of the public sector, 
support for taxes and social reforms, public health care and housing policy, and maintenance of labour market 
regulations.  
 
Neo-Liberal Discourse 
 
The neo-liberal index focuses on privatisation and the reduction of the public sector, free trade, reduced 
personal taxation, private health care, less support for social reforms and public housing, and deregulation of 
the labour market. 
 
Ecological Discourse 
 
Finally, we included a dimension to examine emphases on the Ecological discourse. The ecological position 
is determined by statements including a critique of expansionist economic policy and economic growth, and 
those emphasising the priority of environmental protection even at the cost of economic growth.  It also 
includes statements such as the restructuring of society towards an ecological society, opposition to nuclear 
energy, and the limiting of private transport with support instead for public transport.   
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RESULTS 
 
Figure i demonstrates that of the three parties examined, only the Swedish SAP made any reference to the 
Socialist discourse, and here only 13 per cent of statements referred to such an agenda.  In contrast, all three 
of the SDLPs give top priority to the Welfare State discourse in their election rhetorics. However, it is 
surprising to note the degree to which these parties have opened their agendas to the Neo-Liberal discourse, 
which ranks second-place for all of the selected SDLPs. Substantial differences between the parties occur in 
terms of the Ecological discourse, which has greatest influence within the SPD and is completely absent from 
the SAP’s 1994 election agenda. In the following discussion we examine these results in greater detail. 
 
 
Figure i: Discourses of Social Democratic-Labour Parties in Sweden, Germany, and 
Great Britain in National Election Campaigns during the Mid-1990s (per cent). 
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The Relative Importance of the Socialist, Welfare State, Neo-Liberal  and Ecological Discourses 
 
Undoubtedly, the British Labour Party under Tony Blair has undergone significant changes since the 1992 
General Election. This is confirmed by Ian Budge’s longitudinal analysis, tracking Labour’s movement on a 
left-right continuum throughout the post-War period.lv Our data demonstrate that the Labour Party, like the 
German SPD, avoided reference to a Socialist discourse in its manifesto at the 1997 General Election.  Indeed, 
the very term “Socialism” does not appear at all in the 1997 manifesto.  As Freedenlvi notes, ‘instead, it is 
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alluded to via code words such as “outdated dogmatic doctrine”, or the “old left”’. This is an indication of the 
radical programmatic change of the Labour Party.  Our data confirm that, of the three parties examined, only 
the Swedish SAP remains wedded in any degree to a Socialist discourse, and even this is only a very limited 
commitment. 
 The Welfare State discourse clearly dominates in all three SDLPs. As predicted, the SAP focused on 
this discourse particularly strongly. The Labour Party also emphasised the Welfare State extensively. On the 
one hand, this result underlines the transition of New Labour, which is today quite a typical SDLP in its 
election discourse. On the other hand, the lower emphasis given to the Welfare State discourse within the SPD 
is largely a result of the relative saliency of the Ecological discourse in Germany (see below). 
 In respect of the Neo-Liberal discourse, the three SDLPs are remarkably similar. However, even if the 
differences among these three parties are relatively small, in some important respects the results vary from 
those that we had initially predicted. As we forecast, the Swedish SAP was least likely to embrace a free 
market agenda; however, rather unexpectedly, the German SPD pursued a Neo-Liberal agenda more 
vigorously than the British Labour Party.  This suggests that the SPD is increasingly open to market oriented 
solutions as a means for attempting to overcome the severe economic problems following German unification. 
As far as the Labour Party is concerned, its emphasis on Neo-Liberalism is certainly not such as to set it apart 
from the other SDLPs we examined, and indeed is less so than for the SPD. This suggests that the Labour 
Party has not merely adjusted to the liberal welfare state regime, but has transformed from a socialist party 
into a welfare state party. However, it must be stressed that the integration of Neo-Liberal elements is a 
common phenomenon for all the SDLPs which we analysed. It is by no means unique to New Labour. 
 Interestingly, the three parties examined differ substantially in their respective integration of the 
Ecological discourse. However, the data confirm the hypothesis outlined earlier. The SPD clearly has a greater 
ecological orientation than the other two parties. More than a quarter of all statements made by the SPD in 
respect of the four discourses examined refer to the Ecological discourse. This is in sharp contrast to the SAP, 
which made no reference to the Ecological discourse in its program at all. Furthermore, the SAP actually 
focuses extensively on aspects which are opposed to a Green ideology, including economic growth, the use of 
nuclear energy, and so on.lvii  The degree to which the Labour Party mentioned ecological aspects was as 
expected. It is clearly behind the SPD in this respect, and can certainly not be labelled as a ‘Green’ social 
democratic party. However, unlike the Swedish SAP, it is not entirely closed to these kinds of aspects in its 
electioneering. 
 
 
Welfare State Regimes and Characteristics of Social Democratic-Labour Parties 
 
Even if the political environment is important for the programmatic adjustments of the SDLPs, the welfare 
state regime seems not to have a direct impact on the party positions. The Labour Party, operating as it does 
within a liberal welfare state regime, does not give more attention to the Neo-Liberal discourse than its 
counterparts in the other countries examined. However, there is some evidence that the SAP, working within 
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a welfare state regime, tends to emphasise the Welfare State discourse strongly. For the German SPD, the 
challenges of an increasingly emergent environmental agenda in general, and of the Green Party in 
particularlviii have left profound marks on its program. Neither of the other two SDLPs in our study expressed 
nearly as many statements referring to the Ecological discourse. 
 The characterisation of the three SDLPs leads us to draw the following conclusions. The SPD is an 
ecological social democratic party. The SAP is a social democratic party with a strong Socialist discourse. 
According to the historical development and transition of social democracy lix we may say that the SAP 
remains a traditional social democratic party while the SPD is a transformed social democratic party. This 
implies that the SAP remains faithful to the traditional discourses of the Welfare State and Socialism. The 
SPD has adopted positions which are broadly associated with the New Left, such as environmental issues.lx  
The British Labour Party sits at an intermediate position between the SAP and SPD. There was no emphasis 
given by Labour to a Socialist discourse in its rhetoric at the 1997 General Election. However, it focused more 
strongly on welfare state issues and less so on environmental issues than the SPD. From this, we can conclude 
that the transition of New Labour is within the margins of the development of SDLPs in Western Europe. 
Alongside this development has been an integration of Neo-Liberal aspects which all the three parties in our 
study have in common. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The results of our analyses of the discourses of the three West European SDLPs selected suggest that the 
Welfare State discourse is dominant in all these parties. The Socialist discourse is now of only marginal 
influence. However, SDLPs are challenged by other competing discourses, the most significant of which is 
the challenge of the Neo-Liberal discourse. All three SDLPs integrated elements of this Neo-Liberal discourse 
into their respective election campaigns in the mid-1990s. 
 The response to the ecological challenge is less uniform. Only the German SPD, challenged by the 
Greens, opened their policy agenda to any significant degree to ecological issues. In very sharp contrast, the 
Swedish SAP did not integrate any elements of this discourse into their party appeal in the 1994 election. The 
Labour Party takes a position between these two parties, although it is closer to the SAP than the SPD. 
 Considering the fundamental changes which it has recently undergone, we conclude that the British 
Labour Party has adjusted to the trend of change experienced by SDLPs across Western Europe. In terms of 
statements made in its manifesto and during television debates, Labour does not appear to have positioned 
itself at an ideological location markedly different from either the SPD or SAP. Its development seems to 
match the generalised programmatic adjustment taken by other  SDLPs in the 1990s. 
 Although all three West European SDLPs are quite similar in terms of their discourses, the processes 
which have led to these positions, and the directions they are taking are quite distinct. The SPD is an ecological 
social democratic party. The challenge of the Green Party also effects the intra-organisational policy of the 
SPD, and this is also confirmed by our data.  The SAP, although open to the Socialist and Neo-Liberal 
  16 
discourse, is closed to the Ecological discourse. This may be an indicator of the materialist and economic 
orientation of the SAP, which has also been confirmed in terms of its position with respect to other left-
libertarian issues such as feminism.lxi  The Labour Party has undergone a fundamental transition. New Labour 
is certainly a social democratic party. However, in its 1997 election campaigning, the extent of its emphasis 
on Neo-Liberal aspects was not significantly different from either the SPD or SAP. From this point of view, 
the changes within the Labour Party may appear radical within the context of British politics.  However, from 
an international comparative perspective, these adjustments merely parallel a common trend which is taking 
place elsewhere across Western Europe. 
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